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Quantifying human group dynamics represents a unique challenge. Unlike animals and other
biological systems, humans form groups in both real (offline) and virtual (online) spaces – from
potentially dangerous street gangs populated mostly by disaffected male youths, through to the
massive global guilds in online role-playing games for which membership currently exceeds tens
of millions of people from all possible backgrounds, age-groups and genders. We have compiled
and analyzed data for these two seemingly unrelated offline and online human activities, and have
uncovered an unexpected quantitative link between them. Although their overall dynamics differ
visibly, we find that a common team-based model can accurately reproduce the quantitative features
of each simply by adjusting the average tolerance level and attribute range for each population. By
contrast, we find no evidence to support a version of the model based on like-seeking-like (i.e. kinship
or ‘homophily’).
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantifying the group dynamics of living objects is a
fundamental challenge across the sciences [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Humans represent a particularly diffi-
cult case to analyze, since their groups can be formed in
both real (offline) and virtual (online) spaces. Such fas-
cinating sociological challenges have attracted the atten-
tion of many physicists in recent years under the heading
of Econophysics and Sociophysics [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
Indeed, the Econophysics website provides a rapidly in-
creasing repertoire of such investigations [14].
Massively multiplayer online games typically allow in-
dividuals to spontaneously form, join or leave a formal
group called a guild [15, 16]. The design of the game
encourages players to form such groups by making the
most rewarding quests (i.e., missions) too difficult to
accomplish alone. Millions of people worldwide log on
to the world’s largest online game (World of Warcraft
(WoW)) for the equivalent of several days every week.
Indeed, online games are one of the largest collective hu-
man activities on the planet and hence of interest from
the perspectives of global commerce [17], security [18]
and even epidemiology [19]. A seemingly unrelated so-
cial phenomenon which is also of great concern, is ur-
ban gangs. Urban gangs have been gaining in popularity
among young people both nationally and internationally
[20, 21, 22]. There are obvious differences in the settings
and history of online guilds and offline gangs, however
the empirical datasets that we have compiled enable us
to perform a unique comparative study of their respective
grouping dynamics [15, 16, 22].
Studies of the formation and evolution of groups have
long occupied a central position within the sociologi-
cal and organizational theory literatures, particularly in
terms of understanding how individual level characteris-
tics (e.g., demographics, skill sets) shape group dynamics
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Propo-
nents of homophily tend to argue that individuals choose
to participate in groups that minimize within-group het-
erogeniety, since sameness facilitates communication and
reduces potential conflict [4, 28, 29, 30, 31]. With respect
to stability, previous research has suggested that mem-
bers of groups that are most unlike the other members
of the group are also more likely to exit the group [32].
By contrast, some researchers suggested that rather than
minimize diversity among members, members might in-
stead join groups that maximize the diversity of skills in
the group (team) [33, 34] since a wider skill set might be
more efficient in meeting particular goals [11, 33, 34].
In this paper, we analyze data obtained from street
gangs in the offline, real world [20, 21, 22] and Internet
guilds in virtual online worlds within massively multi-
player online role-playing games [15, 16, 17]. We de-
velop and employ a physically motivated model to ana-
lyze these two high profile, yet seemingly unrelated, hu-
man activities. The underlying datasets were obtained
from online WoW guilds [15, 16] and urban street gangs
in Long Beach, California [22]. They have been sepa-
rately compiled by members of our team over the past few
years through a combination of field-work and data com-
pilation, and are believed to be state-of-the-art datasets
2for each respective system. As a result of our analy-
sis, we uncover evidence of a quantitative link between
the collective dynamics in these two systems. Although
the observable group-size distributions are very different,
we find that a common microscopic mechanism can re-
produce the observed grouping data for each, simply by
adjusting the populations’ average attribute property. In
particular, we find that the evolution of gang-like groups
in the real and virtual world can be explained using
the same team-based group formation mechanism. In
contrast to the quantitative success of our team-based
model, we find that a homophilic version of the model
fails. Our findings thus provide quantitative evidence
that online guilds and offline gangs are both driven by
team-formation considerations, rather than like-seeking-
like. Interestingly, each server’s Internet Protocol (IP)
address seems to play an equivalent role to a gang eth-
nicity. Given the current public concern regarding the
social consequences of intensive Internet game-playing,
and separately the current rise in street gangs [20, 21, 22],
we hope that the present findings help contribute to the
debate by setting these systems on a common footing.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Sec. II gives the
main empirical results that are to be modelled. Section
III gives the key ideas and a detailed description of our
self-organized team formation model. The main results
comparing the cumulative group size distributions from
our model and real data for both WoW guilds and LA
gangs are also presented, in order to establish the valid-
ity of our model. Section IV gives further analysis of the
non-cumulative WoW guild size distributions for sepa-
rate servers, as well as the group size distributions for LA
gangs of different ethnic groups. These results represent
a more stringent test of our model. Section V defines the
kinship model and demonstrates its inadequacy. Finally,
Sec. VI provides the conclusions and discusses the impli-
cations. Note that our philosophy throughout this work
was to see if we could identify a minimal model which is
consistent with the empirical observations from two very
different human grouping activities – one offline and one
online. More complex models can of course be built, and
may even agree better with particular portions of the em-
pirical data. Likewise, we cannot prove that the model
that we propose is strictly the minimal model. However,
we have explored many similar models, and the one that
we present seems the most reasonable, least complicated
and provides the best empirical fit.
II. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As explained in Ref. [15], World of Warcraft (WoW) is
a massively multiplayer online role-playing game, where
players control a character avatar within a virtual world,
exploring the landscape, completing quests and interact-
ing with other players. To enter the game, the player
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FIG. 1: (Color Online) Internet guilds and street gangs. (a)
Empirical data from World of Warcraft on all servers. (b) Cu-
mulative distribution differs significantly from a power-law.
Inset shows the averaged churn C of the guilds. (c) Cumu-
lative distribution for Long Beach (i.e. ‘LA’) gangs. Inset
shows the underlying discrete distribution.
3must select a particular realm (or server), each of which
acts as an individual copy of the game world [15]. Within
the game itself, players can group themselves into guilds
which may offer an advantage when tackling certain chal-
lenges within the game. Guilds are self-organized groups
whose size, composition and lifetime are not fixed or
pre-determined. Instead, the population tends to self-
organize itself into an evolving ecology of such guild
groups – and their exact size and composition can be
accessed at any time from the electronic records stored
on all the participating servers. By contrast, most stud-
ies of social group behavior in the real world are plagued
by a lack of dynamical information about group size and
membership, and the practical restrictions to small sam-
ples (as opposed to several million WoW players) and
specific geographical locations (as opposed to the global
Internet). This explains the attraction of such online
games for studying collective human behavior. Within
the WoW game itself, each player can be regarded as
having certain attributes. While such an attribute list in
practice may be an extended vector, we take the minimal
model approach of expressing this attribute in terms of
the measures of a single variable (see later). The decision
to leave or join a guild (i.e. group) does not lie solely at
the discretion of the individual player involved – instead,
the player and guild in question must find each other to
be mutually acceptable.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the guild size distribution
N(s) and cumulative guild size distribution N(s′ > s) for
a typical one-month period within the full WoW dataset.
The full WoW dataset itself was collected from three dif-
ferent servers – each representing a different game envi-
ronment – between June 2005 and December 2005, and is
representative of the entire game’s recent history. There
are 76686 agents involved in a total of 3992 guilds spread
across three servers: S1, S2, and S3. The cumulative dis-
tributions for the separate servers S1, S2 and S3 will be
shown later (see Fig. 6(a)). All three servers are based
in the US and were selected at random, with the servers’
identities anonymized to preserve players’ privacy. The
vertical axis N(s) is the number of guilds of size s. Data
is shown using October 2005 as a representative month,
however other months show similar behavior as demon-
strated in a later section. Interestingly, the distribution
is neither a Gaussian nor a power-law. Figure 1(b) con-
firms that if we were to insist on power-law behavior,
the supposedly constant slope in N(s′ > s) would vary
unacceptably. The inset in Fig. 1(b) shows the quantity
called the averaged churn C versus the guild size s, where
C describes the monthly guild dynamics as follows: The
membership of a guild is recorded at the beginning and
end of each month, with the churn being the number of
players who were members at the beginning of the month
but who then left during that month. For guilds which
have the same size at the beginning of the month, we
then average over the churn values and call this averaged
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FIG. 2: (Color Online) (a) WoW guild size distributions N(s)
for the months June, August, October, and December 2005.
The total numbers of players in these months are 80183,
93127, 76686, and 93322, respectively. (b) The cumulative
guild size distributions N(s′ > s) for each of the four months.
quantity C. We have checked across different months,
and have also looked at different measures, in order to
convince ourselves that the data in Fig. 1 are typical of
the WoW data. Figure 1(c) shows our empirical data for
the 5214 members of street gangs in Long Beach, Cali-
fornia just outside of Los Angeles. The data are shown
for June 2005, but again other months show similar be-
havior. For convenience, we label these as ‘LA gangs’.
All gangs are included irrespective of their ethnicity (e.g.
Latino). The number of real gangs is much smaller than
the number of guilds in WoW. N(s′ > s) for gangs is not
smooth – nor is it a power-law with a well-defined slope,
as shown explicitly in Fig. 1(c).
A. WoW: Monthly Guild Size Distributions and
Churn
To demonstrate that the form of the distribution in
October 2005 is typical of the WoW data, we also an-
alyzed the data for all the remaining months. For each
month, we repeat the same exercise of counting the guilds
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FIG. 3: (Color Online) The average churn C (as defined in
text) as a function of guild size in the WoW dataset on a
log-log plot, treating the data in all three servers collectively.
Data are shown for the months June, August, October, and
December 2005. Note the inset of Fig.1(b) shows the same
data, but on a linear scale and for October only.
and their sizes for each server. Here, we show the data
for several additional months (i.e. June, August and De-
cember 2005) as well as October 2005. The empirical
data shows that the number of players in each month
was 80183 (June), 93127 (August), 76686 (October), and
93322 (December). Figure 2 shows N(s) and N(s′ > s)
for these four months. The distributions for different
months behave in a similar way. The results indicate that
the guild size distribution measured at any time during
the data collection process, represents a general property
of the game during the entire data collection window.
In the inset of Fig. 1(b), we showed the values of C
for all the guilds in the three servers (S1, S2, S3) for
October 2005. Here, the data of C for June, August, and
December 2005 are shown in Fig. 3. The data indicate
that the behavior ofC versus guild size is almost the same
for every month. Thus, the behavior C ∼ s is a general
feature of the WoW data. We have also analyzed the data
for separate servers, and the behavior is again nearly the
same. Note that there are necessarily fewer data points
for a single server, hence it is more convenient to show
the results corresponding to all servers bundled together.
Later, we will compare results of N(s) as obtained by our
team-formation model with data of separate servers (see
Fig. 7).
B. LA gangs: Different ethnic groups
Our dataset on LA gangs collected in June 2005 con-
sists of the sizes and the ethnicity of the gangs. Putting
all the data together, there are a total of 5214 mem-
bers. The cumulative distribution N(s′ > s) was shown
in Fig. 1(c). The distribution shows a similar shape as
for the WoW cumulative guild size distribution. From
the information on the ethnicity of the gangs, there are
three main ethnic groups that one can identify. For pri-
vacy reasons, we label these groups as E1, E2, and E3,
with membership 608, 1504, 2552, respectively. Figure 4
shows the cumulative gang size distributions N(s′ > s)
for the three major ethnic groups. For each of these eth-
nic groups, the number of gangs is very small (around
10). For this reason, N(s′ > s) shows step-like behavior.
Comparing with WoW data, the total number of gangs
and the number of members in the LA gang data are
both much smaller than the corresponding numbers in
WoW. In a later section, we will compare the results for
our team-formation model with these data of different
ethnicity groups (see Fig. 8).
III. SELF-ORGANIZED TEAM FORMATION
MODEL AND MAIN MODELLING RESULTS
We now introduce the key ideas within our model,
describe its details, and show that it reproduces accu-
rately the quantitative features of the empirical data. As
an overview, Fig. 5(a) shows our generic model of self-
organized group formation which acts as the core setup
for implementing specific rule-sets for joining and leaving
a group – for example, team-formation (see Fig. 5(b)) or
homophilic kinship. Our generic model (Fig. 5(a)) cre-
ates a heterogeneous population by assigning an attribute
pi to each person (i.e. agent) i. Since people may have
a range of attributes, we assign each agent a spread ∆pi
around pi. With the goal of building a minimal model,
we choose each pi to be a single number chosen randomly
from a uniform distribution between zero and one. More
complicated models can of course be built by assigning,
for example, an array of numbers to describe the at-
tributes of a person – however we again stress that we are
seeking a minimal model in the present work. The values
of ∆pi’s are random numbers drawn from a single-peaked
distribution with mean 〈∆pi〉 and spread (i.e. standard
deviation) σ∆p. The ∆pi values are shown in Fig. 5 as
horizontal bars around the corresponding color-coded pi
value. We then assign a tolerance to every agent – for
simplicity, we choose the same value τ for each agent.
The tree on the right-hand side of Fig. 5(a) applies to
both team- formation and kinship versions. In the team-
formation version, the group contains agents with com-
plementary attributes (i.e. a team) while in the kinship
version a group contains agents with similar attributes
(i.e. like with like).
The model can be constructed without considering a
particular context. It could represent players in WoW,
members in gangs, employees in companies, etc. Fig-
ure 5(b) describes what happens in one timestep in
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FIG. 4: (Color Online) The cumulative gang size distribution N(s′ > s) for LA gangs of three main ethnic groups. (a)
Cumulative gang size distribution for gangs with ethnicity E1. The total membership is N = 608. (b) Ethnicity E2 with total
membership N = 1504. (c) Ethnicity E3 with total membership N = 2552.
the team-formation implementation of Fig. 5(a), both
schematically and mathematically. The kinship model,
described later, essentially corresponds to an opposite
set of add-on rules to the team-formation model. The
team-formation model, as we shall see, works better for
the empirical data and we will focus on it in this section.
We will use the words ‘team’ and ‘group’ interchange-
ably in the following discussion. However we emphasize
that for the portions of the following discussion concern-
ing Fig. 5(a), the word ‘team’ can be replaced by ‘group’
since the statements apply equally to the team-formation
model and the kinship model.
Parameters – Consider a population of N agents or
players. The attributes of an agent i are described by a
set of numbers (pi,∆pi, τi), where pi describes the ith-
agent’s mean attribute. ∆pi describes the i-th player’s
range of attributes around pi, or equivalently a breadth
of skills around the mean skill. The value of ∆pi is inde-
pendent of the value of pi. Here, τi is a parameter that
describes the tolerance of an agent in deciding whether to
leave a group, after he compares how close his attributes
are to the members of the group. In the present model,
we have not included the possible evolution of attributes,
although this is an interesting problem for future studies.
Initialization – Initially, each agent is randomly as-
signed his attribute parameter pi, the value of which is
chosen randomly from a uniform distribution between 0
and 1. The agents’ ∆pi’s are assumed to follow a Gaus-
sian distribution characterized by a mean 〈∆pi〉 and stan-
dard deviation σ∆p. Each agent is then assigned a value
of ∆pi from this Gaussian distribution. With pi and ∆pi,
the agent i covers the attributes pi ±∆pi, for attributes
characterized by the range between 0 and 1. The cover-
age of attributes is not allowed to go below 0 or above
1, i.e., when pi + ∆pi > 1, the upper bound is set at 1
and when pi −∆pi < 0, the lower bound is set at 0. For
simplicity, the values of τi are taken to be the same for
all agents, i.e., τi = τ for all agents. The total number
of agents in the system N can be easily taken from the
real data. Thus, the model is completely characterized
by four physically meaningful parameters: N , 〈∆pi〉, σ∆p
and τ .
Key Ideas and Model Implementation – In each
timestep, an agent i is randomly picked. The attachment
of the agent i to a group then follows the rules below.
(a) For a single agent joining a team – This step
is imposed when the agent i being picked is an iso-
lated agent. In this case, another agent j is ran-
domly picked. The agent j belongs to a team la-
belled J with nJ members. Note that nJ = 1 if j is
an isolated agent. The key idea is that it is a two-
way consideration when an agent i wants to join a
team J : the agent must find a team to which his
attributes could contribute, and that team must in
turn find the agent’s attributes acceptable. More-
over, the agent can only see the average attributes
of the team to which he is applying. In other words,
when joining a team, an agent will be guided by
general information about the team (i.e. the av-
erage attribute of the team) rather than detailed
information about all its members. This mimics
the fact that an outsider cannot be expected to be
aware of all the details of a team’s members before
joining, since such knowledge can generally only be
gained after being a member of that team. Once in-
side the team, this information can then be gained
either through direct access to insider knowledge,
or simply through osmosis.
An agent i therefore assesses a team J which he
considers joining, by looking at the average at-
tribute PJ of that team:
PJ =
1
nJ
∑
k∈J
pk, (1)
where the sum is over all members of team J . The
agent i will find the team suitable if his attributes
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FIG. 5: (Color Online) Our generic model of group dynamics. (a) The basic model setup, without yet specifying the criterion
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Fig. 5(b), where an agent seeks a group with a suitable niche in p-space, and the kinship model (not shown) where an agent
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Sec.III.
7complement those of the existing members. There-
fore, if his attributes are too close to that of the ex-
isting members of the team, he feels that he could
not contribute much and he will not join the team.
The condition that the agent i finds the team J ac-
ceptable can thus be modelled by |pi − PJ | > ∆pi.
For the team J , it will consider whether to enroll
agent i as a new member. As an applicant to the
team J , the team will know the range of attributes
that agent i could cover and then assess the po-
tential contribution of agent i to the team. This
can be measured by counting the number of exist-
ing members with attributes in the range of agent
i, normalized by the team size nJ . Thus, we define
fi,J as
fi,J =
1
nJ
∑
j∈J
θ(∆pi − |pj − pi|), (2)
where the sum is over all members in team J and
θ(x) is the Heaviside function, i.e., θ(x) = 1 for
x > 0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise. In deciding whether
to accept a new member, we define a team’s tol-
erance by averaging the individual tolerance of its
members, i.e.,
τJ =
1
nJ
∑
j∈J
τj . (3)
For τj = τ for all agents, τJ = τ . Note that fi,J
is a quantity less than unity. If fi,J is large, many
existing members in team J have attributes that
are close to that of agent i and thus the team tends
not to accept agent i as a new member due to re-
dundance in attributes. Thus, the condition that
the team J will accept agent i as a new member is
fi,J < τJ .
Considering joining a team requires two-way con-
sideration, the criteria for an agent i joining a team
J are: |pi − PJ | > ∆pi and fi,J < τJ .
(b) For an agent leaving a group, finding a better
group, or for groups merging – This step is
imposed when the agent i being picked belongs to
a group labelled I with nI (nI > 1) members. The
following attempts are implemented in sequence.
(i) Agent i decides whether he can tolerate the
team – After being a member of team I for a while,
the agent i has the chance to explore the micro-
scopic details (individual attributes) of the team
members. The key idea is that if he finds that there
are many members with similar attributes to his,
he will leave. To decide whether he can tolerate the
team, he looks at the fraction fi of members in the
team with attributes within his range of coverage,
i.e.,
fi =
1
nI − 1
∑
k∈I(k 6=i)
θ(∆pi − |pk − pi|), (4)
where the sum is over all the agents in the team I
except the agent i himself. Note that 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1. If
fi is close to 1, then there are too many members
with similar attributes and the agent i will have a
higher tendency to leave. If fi > τi, the i-th agent
cannot tolerate the team any more and he leaves the
group to become an isolated agent. If this happens,
the timestep ends.
(ii) Another key idea is team switching. If the agent
i finds that he can tolerate the team, it does not
necessarily mean that he is very happy with the
team. He will try to find a better (more suitable)
team to join. An agent j, who belongs to a group J ,
is randomly picked. The agent i will then compare
whether the current team I or the team J is more
suitable for him. He intends to join team J if |pi −
PJ | > |pi − PI |. This criterion implies that the
agent i finds that he can contribute more in team
J than in team I. Whether team J would accept
agent i as a new member is again determined by
the criterion fi,J < τJ , as in step (a). Thus, the
criteria for agent i to switch from team I to team J
successfully are |pi −PJ | > |pi−PI | and fi,J < τJ .
If there is group switching, the timestep ends. We
remark that the steps (b)(i) and (ii) are similar
to job hunting. If the job is too bad, then one
will simply quit without finding a new job. This
is reflected in (b)(i). However, even if the job is
acceptable, one tries to look for a better job. In
job hunting, it is a two-way process: The employer
is looking for someone who can cover the weaker
aspects or services in a company, and the employee
is looking for a better place. This is reflected in
(b)(ii).
(iii) The next key idea is to allow for team mergers. If
nothing actually happened in (i) and (ii), i.e., the i-
th agent does not leave the team I, either because
he is happy or because team switching does not
work, we consider the possibility of allowing two
teams to merge. Team I to which agent i belongs,
merges with another team J under the criterion
|PI − PJ | > ∆PI , where ∆PI = (1/nI)
∑
i∈I ∆pi.
Similarly, team J considers merging with team I
under the criterion |PJ−PI | > ∆PJ . That is to say,
if |PI−PJ | > max(∆PI ,∆PJ ), then teams I and J
merge to form a bigger team. Note that there are
two ways to implement mergers. The team J could
be the same team that the j-th agent belonged to in
procedure (ii) above, or a new agent j can be picked
8randomly when mergers are considered. Results are
nearly identical for the two ways.
To summarize, the key ingredients in our team-
formation model are: (i) Teams tend to recruit mem-
bers to cover a spectrum of attributes; (ii) agent joins a
team by assessing his potential contribution to the team;
(iii) agent joining a team only sees an average of the at-
tributes of a team; (iv) team accepts new member by
assessing his potential contribution; (v) agent leaves a
team when there are many members with similar at-
tributes; (vi) agent always looks for better teams where
he could contribute more; and (vii) team tends to expand
by mergers when its membership becomes stable. Each of
these ingredients seems reasonable based on our common
knowledge of how people behave in team situations. We
remark that this set of rules allowed us to produce results
that are similar to the empirical observations for both the
WoW and gangs data. If more data become available in
order to put further constraints on the model, or if we
only want to model a particular subset of the behaviors
arising in the full dataset, then the model’s rules may
either require further elaboration or be further simpli-
fied. For example, ingredient (vi) is needed to model the
averaged churn C in WoW data while ingredient (vii) is
needed to get at the proper sizes of the bigger groups.
Figure 6 highlights the main modelling results. Fig-
ure 6(a) shows that excellent agreement is obtained
across the entire range of observed group sizes for N(s′ >
s), between the empirical WoW guild data from Fig. 1(b)
(dark blue) and the team-formation model (red) of Fig. 5.
Throughout this paper, the model(s) is implemented
with the observed number of agents as an input. Here
τ = 0.69, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.16 and σ∆p = 0.022, but we stress
that good agreement can be obtained across a reasonably
wide range of parameter choices. The remaining panels
(Fig. 6(b)-(d)) show the data separated by server. The
parameter values used are within 10% of those quoted
above. To calculate C in the model, we record the mem-
bership for each guild in a run during 0.7 Monte Carlo
timesteps (after a transient of 1000 Monte Carlo steps).
A Monte Carlo time step is the duration over which each
agent has, on average, been chosen once for carrying out
the dynamics in the model, i.e. each agent has been given
a chance to join or leave a group. We have tried differ-
ent time windows so as to obtain the averaged churn C
in WoW data and found that 0.7 Monte Carlo timesteps
happen to give particularly good agreement. One might
interpret this by claiming that the timescale over which
70% of agents have a chance to carry out a dynamical
update process, represents the real-world timescale for
the churn process – however, it is very hard to associate
timescales in simulations with specific timescales in the
real world. A similar process is followed for the LA gangs
in Fig. 6(e). In an analogous way to the breakdown by
computer server in Fig. 6(a)-(d), one can break down the
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FIG. 6: (Color Online) Empirical data and model compari-
son for (a)-(d) World of Warcraft and (e) LA gangs. Empir-
ical data are dark blue, and the team-formation model from
Fig. 5(b) is in red. The kinship model (light blue) produces
a poor fit in both cases.
LA gang data by ethnicity. The fit by gang ethnicity
(see Sec.IV later) is good even though the numbers are
much smaller than WoW and hence more prone to noise.
This surprising connection between ethnicity and server
is consistent with the fact that it is essentially impossi-
ble to change one’s real-world ethnicity or virtual-world
server (unless a large fee is paid to WoW in the latter
case, and even then it is an irreversible process). It is also
intriguing that the best-fit model parameter values are
so similar across WoW servers, and across gang ethnic-
ities. This suggests a quasi-universal behavior in terms
of the way in which people form gang-like groups on-
line and offline. The small observed server-dependences
(and ethnicity-dependences) can be explained by play-
ers on different servers (and gang members of different
ethnicities) perceiving their environments differently, and
hence adopting slightly different tolerances. Our team-
formation model thus manages to capture all the features
of the empirical gang and guild dynamics, including the
approximately linear increase of the averaged churn C
9with guild size in WoW. By contrast, the kinship (i.e.
homophilic) version (see Sec.V later) of the model does
not reproduce the empirical results of either WoW or the
gangs, even qualitatively, as demonstrated by the light
blue curves in Fig. 6.
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS: N(s) WOW GUILD
SIZE DISTRIBUTION AND N(s′ > s) FOR LA
GANGS OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS
The agreement of our model with WoW data inN(s′ >
s) for all and individual servers (Fig. 6(a)-(d)) can be
further illustrated by comparing the underlying, i.e., non-
cumulative, distribution for the guild size distribution
N(s). SinceN(s) is less smooth and thus more noisy than
the cumulative distribution N(s′ > s), we are actually
executing a more stringent test of the model by carrying
out the team-formation model comparison based onN(s)
instead of N(s′ > s).
From the WoW dataset, we count the number of play-
ers in all the guilds in each server, and also the total
number of players in all servers. In each case, we take
the number of players as input for N and run our team-
formation model. By adjusting the parameters 〈∆pi〉,
σ∆p and τ in the model, we obtained the guild size dis-
tributions N(s) for each of the three separate servers and
for the three servers collectively. Figure 7 shows the N(s)
for our model obtained from one run in each of these
cases, together with the distribution obtained from the
data. The parameters are given in the figure caption.
The results from the team-formation model capture the
essential features in the WoW guild size distributions.
From the parameters for each of the servers, it can be
seen that they are very similar but not identical. This in-
dicates that while the behavior of the players in different
servers are not too different, there are slight differences
indicating some kind of special characteristic of a server
or game environment. We will see that similar features
also appear in the LA gang data, when treating ethnic-
ity separately. To the extent to which the server identity
mimics an ethnicity, this seems to open up some deeper
sociological questions which can be explored in future
research on guilds and gangs.
From our attempts in modelling the real data, we now
make a few comments on the model as related to the key
features in real data: Step (a) (see Sec.III) that sets the
criteria for an agent to join a team and a team to accept a
new member is the essence of the team-formation model.
This is essential in getting the shape of N(s′ > s). We
observed that the shape of N(s′ > s), and thus N(s), is
more sensitive to the parameter τ . In the WoW data,
there is a quantity called C. In order to get reason-
able values for C, a mechanism is required for agents to
leave a team or to switch teams readily. Steps (b)(i) and
(b)(ii) serve to provide such a mechanism. In order to
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FIG. 7: (Color Online) The WoW guild size distribution
N(s) in October 2005. (a) Guild size distribution treating all
servers collectively. The parameters used for team formation
are N = 76686, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.160, σ∆p = 0.022, and τ = 0.69.
(b) Guild size distribution of server S1. The parameters used
for team formation simulation are N = 24033, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.160,
σ∆p = 0.020, and τ = 0.67. (c) Guild size distribution of
server S2. The parameters used for team formation simulation
are N = 24477, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.160, σ∆p = 0.025, and τ = 0.75.
(d) Guild size distribution of server S3. The parameters used
for team formation simulation are N = 28176, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.161,
σ∆p = 0.020, and τ = 0.70. Each simulation result is obtained
from one particular run of the team-formation model. Note
that the parameters for different servers are very similar.
get at the largest size of the guilds in real data, we need
a mechanism for guilds to merge. Step (b)(iii) serves this
purpose.
If we were to focus only on fitting the guild-size or
gang-size distributions, and hence decided not to care
about simultaneously fitting the churn C in the WoW
data, we could construct even simpler versions of our
model and yet still obtain group-size distributions simi-
lar to the real data. For example, a model with slower
team switching and more static groups can be used to
get at N(s′ > s) similar to real data. However, with
our present team-formation model we have managed to
fit these size distributions and account for the churn.
One implication of our work is therefore that previous
grouping models which have been proposed to explain
time-averaged group sizes in real data without churn,
should be re-examined once such churn data becomes
available. Fitting churn as well as the group-size distri-
bution presents a stringent challenge which relatively few
candidate models will survive. Performing studies analo-
gous to our present one, would therefore be a very useful
way of reducing the number of competing models. Like-
wise our own extensive experimentation indicates that it
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would be very hard to identify an alternative model to our
team-formation one, in which equally high quantitative
accuracy was obtained and yet the structure and/or set
of microscopic rules were fundamentally different. This
gives us confidence that our analysis has indeed identified
a realistic group formation mechanism.
We have tested our model against the empirical data
of N(s′ > s) for LA gangs data, treating all the gangs
collectively (Fig. 6(e)). Here, we further test our model
for the three major ethnic groups as shown in Fig. 4.
Treating the ethnicity as the analogy of servers in WoW,
we counted the number of members in the gangs in each
of the ethnic groups. For the three major ethnic groups
E1, E2, and E3, there are 608, 1504, and 2552 mem-
bers, respectively. These numbers are used as inputs to
our model. We then adjust the parameter values in the
model to give a distribution N(s′ > s) that resembles
the empirical data, for each of the three cases. Figure
8 shows the results for the ethnic groups E1, E2, E3.
It is very encouraging that our model manages to cap-
ture the main features of the empirical data for the LA
gangs, even though the individual gang sizes and num-
ber of gangs in each ethnic group are much smaller than
for the case of WoW. Note that the parameters (given in
the caption) are quite similar for different ethnic groups.
Interestingly, using the value of N from the empirical
data for each of the ethnic groups, the resulting number
of groups in our team-formation model turns out to be
similar to that for the empirical data. From the results
of WoW guilds and street gangs, we can see that the role
of server in WoW has a direct analogy with the role of
ethnicity in street gangs.
In summary, our team-formation model reproduces
the main quantitative features of the empirical WoW
guild size distribution and the cumulative distribution
(Fig. 1(a), Fig. 1(b), Fig. 2), in the case when the servers
are considered collectively (Fig. 6(a)-(d)) and in the case
when the servers are considered individually (Fig. 7).
The model also reproduces the main feature in the group
dynamics (Fig. 6(a)-(d)) observed in the empirical data
on churn (Fig.1(b) and Fig. 3). Furthermore, the agree-
ment between model and empirical data extents to re-
sults in different time windows (i.e. months). Our
team-formation model also reproduces the main quan-
titative features of cumulative gang size distributions in
empirical data (Fig. 1(c)), taking the ethnicity collec-
tively (Fig. 6(e)) and separately (Fig. 8). Thus, our self-
organized team-formation model captures quantitatively
the features of the group dynamics resulting from cyber-
world interactions, as in the case of WoW guilds, and
real-world interactions as in the case of street gangs.
V. INADEQUACY OF THE ALTERNATIVE
MODEL BASED ON KINSHIP
There are lines (in light blue) in Fig. 6(b) for WoW
server S1 and in Fig. 6(e) for street gangs that show the
results for a kinship model. The kinship model is in many
ways the ‘opposite’ of the team-formation model, and was
introduced to explore homophily as a possible alterna-
tive group-formation mechanism. In the team-formation
model, the teams tend to recruit members with attributes
that spread over the whole spectrum of attributes, i.e.,
the attributes of the agents complement each other. By
contrast in the kinship model, groups form around agents
with similar attributes. In short, agents tend to dislike
being in a group with agents having very different at-
tributes. Here, we briefly discuss the mechanisms in this
kinship model.
We can readily modify our team-formation model in
order to create a kinship formation model, as follows.
The framework in Fig. 5(a) remains the same, and so
does Fig. 5(b) in terms of its structure – however we flip
the inequalities in Fig. 5(b) for the criteria for an agent
joining a group and for a group accepting a member.
A kinship model can hence be defined which is diamet-
rically opposite to our team-formation model, and yet
can be discussed on the same footing. In step (a) (see
Sec.III), the criteria for an agent i joining a group J are:
|pi−PJ | ≤ ∆pi and fi,J ≥ τJ . These imply that an agent
wants to join a group with an average attribute close
to his own, and a group wants to accept new members
having attributes close to its existing members. In step
(b)(i), an agent i cannot tolerate a group I when he finds
the members are too different from him. Thus the agent
leaves if fi < τi. In step (b)(ii), each agent is continu-
ally looking for a better group which has a more similar
average attribute to him. So group switching happens if
|pi−PJ | < |pi−PI | and fi,J ≥ τJ . Finally, when member-
ship becomes stable, a group tends to expand by merging
with groups having similar average attributes. Thus two
groups I and J merge if |PI − PJ | ≤ min(∆PI ,∆PJ ).
In fact, for every team formation model that incorpo-
rates the idea of agents with different attributes tend-
ing to form a team, a corresponding kinship model can
be identified, built around the opposite idea of agents
with similar attributes forming groups. However the cu-
mulative distribution function obtained from the kinship
model cannot capture even the basic qualitative shape of
the empirical data. The detailed reason is that the kin-
ship model tends to produce too many groups of small
sizes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The analysis in this paper contributes to a growing
movement within physics which aims to build quantita-
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FIG. 8: (Color Online) The cumulative gang size distribution N(s′ > s) for LA gangs of different ethnicity. (a) N(s′ > s) of
membership of LA gangs of ethnicity E1. The parameters used for the team formation model are N = 608, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.150,
σ∆p = 0.016, and τ = 0.73. (b) N(s
′ > s) of membership of LA gangs of ethnicity E2. The parameters used for the team
formation model are N = 1504, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.142, σ∆p = 0.014, and τ = 0.72. (c) N(s
′ > s) of membership of LA gangs of
ethnicity E3. The parameters used for the team-formation model are N = 2552, 〈∆pi〉 = 0.141, σ∆p = 0.016, and τ = 0.72.
Each model result corresponds to one run of the team-formation model simulation. Note that the parameters for different
ethnic groups are very similar, as was the case for different servers in WoW.
tive models of collective dynamics in social systems using
the same minimal-model thinking adopted within physics
[35]. We have shown that populations of humans, in two
very different settings, can exhibit behaviors which are
consistent with a common underlying grouping mecha-
nism. This suggests that many of the collective human
behaviors that we observe, might be driven by common
endogenous features rather than setting-specific exoge-
nous details.
Specifically, we used detailed empirical datasets to
show that the observed dynamics in two very distinct
forms of human activity – one offline activity which is
widely considered as a public threat, and one online activ-
ity which is by contrast considered as relatively harmless
– can be reproduced using the same, simple model of in-
dividuals seeking groups with complementary attributes,
i.e., they want to form a team, as opposed to seeking
groups with similar attributes (homophilic kinship). Just
as different ethnicities may have different types of gangs
in the same city in terms of their number, size, and sta-
bility, the same holds for the different computer servers
on which online players play a given game.
Our quantitative results provide a novel addition to
the group formation debate by being (i) able to reproduce
the quantitative features of both the dynamical and time-
averaged behavior observed in the empirical datasets, (ii)
plausible in terms of the individual-based rules that are
used to describe group membership, (iii) robust in terms
of its insensitivity to small perturbations in the model’s
specification and parameter values, (iv) minimal in that
the number of free parameters in the model is kept to
a minimum, given the available datasets to be modelled,
and (v) able to shed light on what mechanistic rules drive
people to join and leave such groups in offline and online
situations and provide the basis for further investigations.
This close relationship that we have uncovered between
gangs and guilds, might be less surprising if it were true
that both are populated by a similar sector of society.
However this is not the case. Online games are played
equally by men and women across all age groups, lo-
cations and backgrounds [15, 16, 17], while gangs are
mostly populated by teenage urban males from partic-
ular backgrounds [20]. Instead, we believe that our re-
sults demonstrate a commonality in the way in which hu-
mans form such offline and online groups. Interestingly
this echoes recent claims by international law enforce-
ment agencies concerning the hybrid nature of transna-
tional gangs (‘maras’), crime organizations, insurgencies
and terrorist groups, whose interactions and activities are
now beginning to blur the boundaries between real and
virtual spaces [20].
Finally we note that this work throws up the interest-
ing challenge of providing analytic solutions to accom-
pany the empirical findings and numerical simulations.
Work is proceeding in this direction, though the diffi-
culty of including internal degrees of freedom, i.e., the
model attributes, in general coalescence-fragmentation
problems is daunting.
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